Truth Conditions for Indicative Conditionals . Robert Stalnaker’s () account is of this type: consider a possible situation in which you touch. Yet if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically For a fuller discussion and defense of this concept, see Stalnaker. The problem is that if one accepts the validity of the intuitively reasonable direct argument from the material conditional to the ordinary indicative conditional.

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Now consider the conditionals 1 If she stops before half way, she will stop in the 1 st mile. Note that, as in the previous approach, probability is not probability of truth.

The nurse puts a pillow over the patient’s face and kills her. I told you so. The other is the content of a judgement made under that supposition. The capacity of the tank is just enough to do miles: Byrne – – Psychological Review 4: Then the pragmatic constraint requires that for any world in the context set, the nearest A -world to it is also in the context set.

Its main disadvantage is that the semantics is very complex: The latter was the criterion Adams used in constructing his logic. Page references to I think the consequent is true: This is just to say that one’s confidence in a conditional is measured by p A B. Let A be epistemically possible for me. Not all the relevant A -possibilities are C -possibilities.


Someone might react as follows: See also David Barnett We use them in arguing from contingent premises about which we are often less than completely certain. If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.

Brian Weatherson – – Philosophical Quarterly 51 Publications Pages Publications Pages. It was Gibbardpp. A conditional judgement involves two propositions, which play different roles. But when A is false at wwhich is the nearest A -world may not be determined by the facts. Do the truth-functional truth conditions explain the validity of arguments involving conditionals?

Suppose you think line 1 is about times more likely than line 2. It does not matter if this is a pretence: It is worth seeing what we can learn from it.

The direct way is to imagine that we know for sure that the premise is true, and to consider what we would then think about the conclusion. But it is stretching pragmatics rather far to say the same of the former.

Then you think it is about to 1 that B if A. The difference is this: If the antecedent is false, the question lapses: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.

Indicative Conditionals

If this is his view, he cannot hold that his own theory is a psychologically accurate account of what people do when they use conditionals. Here is a second argument in favour of Hook, in the style of Natural Deduction.


And it has many defenders. The adverb applies to the main clause, its scope restricted by the if-clause.

Indicative Conditionals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Supp saves modus ponens by denying that the argument is really of that form. First let us delimit our field. His lesson was salutary and important.

This point holds for any kind of strict conditional — any kind of ‘must’. InquiryCambridge MA: Some do not, demanding a further relation between the facts that A and that B see Read Science Logic and Mathematics. Truth, Probability and ParadoxOxford: Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. There are two ways in which 50 can indicagive true: But there is no consensus about the truth conditions of conditionals.

Suppose there are two balls in a bag, labelled x and y. And with negations of conditionals and conditionals in antecedents, we saw, the problem is reversed: Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Page references to Lewis He is right, I think, about disjunctions and negated conjunctions. Ways of handling compounds of conditionals have been proposed on the basis of these semantic values.